Essay related to Class Five Themes

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Kabod Habreut (Preserving Man’s Dignity)
Updated:2005-12-14 15:19:55
Author: Rabbi Joseph Esses

The commandments in the Bible can be split into numerous types of groups. One popular way to split them up is to divide them between commandments that are Ben Adam Le’chavero (interpersonal) and between Ben Adam Le’makom (between man and G-d). The commandments that are Ben Adam Le’chavero are a set of logical and societal rules and laws that help society to function. These laws help prevent total chaos and anarchy. Some examples of these laws are not to kill and not to steal. The commandments that are Ben Adam Le’makom are the religious obligations that the community and each individual have. Some examples are the obligation to observe the Sabbath, wear fringes on four cornered garments and not to combine wool and linen.
The topic of discussion for this paper is to explore the issue of kavod Habreut (respect and regard for fellow human beings). Is this concept of respect exclusive between men? Or does it play a role even within the relationship between man and G-d, such that a transgression might be pushed asid (Doche/pushing aside means that we allow the violation because we give preference to one mitzvah over the other) or even permissible (Hutra/permissible means that nothing has been violated) if it will help preserve man’s dignity?
Studying the Bible will reveal a great amount of regard that G-d has for man. We find many different commandments that relate specifically to not embarrassing a fellow human being. The most straightforward of the commandments that prohibit embarrassing somebody else can be found in Leviticus , you shall reprove your fellow and you shall not bear a sin because of him. Rashi explains that the interpretation is that while offering rebuke you should do so in a manner that you do not make his face pale by reproving him in public. The Sefer Hachinuch on this commandment quotes the adage that it is better to let yourself be burned in a fire than to embarrass another person in public. The source of this statement can be found in Genesis with the story of Tamar and Judah. Tamar was willing to be burned for harlotry rather than to embarrass Judah in public by claiming that in fact he was the one that impregnated her.
A further indication of how concerned G-d is that man should not be embarrassed can be found in the segment of the Torah that relates directly to the fines meted out for causing harm to another person. One of the five fines that the assailant is obligated to pay is called Boshet . This accounts for the humiliation that the victim has suffered. The humiliation due to the injury depends on the status of both the offender and the victim. If the victim is an important person, and the offender is of much lower status, the humiliation is correspondingly greater. The fact that a lower class person struck him is in itself a great humiliation.”
Another commandment that illustrates the essence of kabod habreut is the obligation to bury a dead person on the day he dies. This commandment can be found in Deuteronomy “If a man will have committed a sin whose judgment is death and he shall be put to death, and you shall hang him on a wooden beam. His body shall not remain for the night on the wooden beam, rather you shall surely bury him on that day, for a hanging person is an insult of G-d.’ Rashi explains, ‘That a hanging person is a degradation of the king for man is made in the likeness of his image.’ Although this verse mentions only somebody that was hung, all corpses should be buried on the day of their death. It seems quite clear from this commandment that G-d views a degradation of a human being as an affront to his own self. Conversely, showing proper respect to mankind is in a sense showing respect to G-d. Hence there are many commandments that relate directly to preserve man’s dignity.
In addition to the Biblical commandments that express kabod habreut, there are many rabbinic institutions as well. It is the custom now in most synagogues that when it is time to read the Torah in public there is one reader for everybody. It used to be that the best way to accomplish the obligation of reading the Torah is to read it by yourself. However, over the years it became more common that an individual would find it difficult to read the Torah if he were called up. The rabbi’s then instituted the concept of the Ba’al Koreh, one reader for everybody even for someone that is capable of reading the Torah, so that nobody should feel embarrassed by being called up to the Torah.
Similarly during the wedding ceremony the accepted custom is that the rabbi who performs the wedding recites the blessings so that somebody that does not know how to recite the blessings will not feel humiliated.
We also find the importance of kabod habreut by the commandment to give charity, zedaka. The Rambam brings down eight different levels how to perform this mitzvah. The Rambam begins the order from highest to lowest. The best method is to allow the poor person to get back on his feet, either by giving him a loan, or joining in a business venture, until he is able to rebound from his losses and doesn’t need any further assistance. After this the next best level is when the donor doesn’t know who receives the money and the recipient doesn’t know who the donor is. The third level is when the donor knows who accepted the money but the recipient is unaware who gave the money to him. The fourth level is when the recipient knows who gave him the money but the donor doesn’t know who received it. The fifth level is when the donor gives the money before the poor person has a chance to ask for the money. The sixth level is when he gives the money after being asked. The seventh is when he gives less than the acceptable amount, but with pleasure. The eight and lowest level of giving charity is when a person gives begrudgingly.
The reasoning behind these eight levels is quite obvious. The destitute person is already going through a difficult time and the rabbis don’t want him to have to suffer any additional embarrassment by having to ask for money. That is why the best thing to do is to give a job or a loan, this way the individual still retains his dignity and self-respect. Furthermore, when he does have to ask for money we wouldn’t want him to feel embarrassed in front of the person that gave it to him so it is preferable that neither know where the money came from nor where it is going. It is also more hurtful when the individual that received the money knows who gave the money to him even though the donor doesn’t know who received his gift.
Now that we have seen different areas where kavod habreut applies I would like to focus my attention on what to do if a conflict arises between this important mitzvah of kavod habreut and perhaps another mitzvah as well. Which takes precedence over the other? Can the concept of kabod habreut allow one to violate a commandment?
Firstly, I would like to discuss laws that are rabbinic (instituted by the rabbi’s as opposed to Biblical). This topic is the focus in tractate Berachot . “ Rab Yehudah said in the name of Rab: Regarding someone who discovers a mixture of wool and linen in his clothing he must remove the garment, despite the embarrassment involved, even if he is standing in the middle of the marketplace. Why so? Because as scripture says, ‘œThere is no value to wisdom or understanding or counsel when weighed against the honor of Hashem. ‘ This teaches that wherever there is a threat of a desecration of G-d’s name we do not worry about giving respect to a teacher . The Talmud then tries to refute this ruling of Rav with another ruling, that if after burying a dead person and the people were accompanying the mourner in returning home, if the mourner takes a route that is considered ritually unclean, everyone else should follow him out of respect for him even though there is a prohibition for a kohen to become unclean. The Talmud resolves this difficulty by saying that that case is only referring to a beit hapras , whose tumah/impurity is only rabbinic. Since the law itself is only rabbinic the rabbis chose to suspend the impurity to show proper respect to the mourner. We see from here that whenever kabod habreut conflicts with a rabbinic law, we permit the violation of the rabbinic law. Further on in the Talmud another difficulty is raised against Rab’s teaching. ‘Come hear the following Baraita: The value of human dignity is so great that it supersedes even a negative commandment of the Torah. Now why is this so; how could human dignity take precedence over a Torah prohibition? Let us rather have said, ‘œThere is no value to wisdom or understanding or counsel when weighed against the honor of Hashem’! The Talmud resolves this difficulty by stating that the negative commandment that the baraita is referring to is the prohibition of flouting rabbinic authority which is contained in the verse ‘œyou shall not deviate from the matter that they will tell you .’ We see from here again that it is only permissible to transgress a rabbinic decree when it conflicts with kabod habreut but not a Biblical decree.
At this point in this discussion we see that it is quite clear that it is permissible to actively violate rabbinic prohibitions if it will help preserve man’s dignity. Another example can be found in Tractate Shabbat . It states that although rocks are generally mukseh, prohibited from being moved on shabbat, it is nevertheless permissible to use these rocks to wipe oneself based on kabod habreut.
Additionally Menachot states that if a man was walking on shabbat and his sisit/fringes ripped, rendering them pasul, he does not have to remove them if he is in a Carmelit . Generally if one has pasul sisit he is prohibited from wearing them on shabbat because that is considered carrying in an open area. Nevertheless, if removing his garment will cause him to be humiliated it is permissible to continue wearing them in a carmelit because it is only forbidden rabbinically to carry in a carmelit.

Now that we have established that kabod habreut is permitted when it is opposed by rabbinic prohibitions, I would like to discuss Biblical commandments. As mentioned earlier, there is an obligation to bury a corpse on the day of death. It is permitted to delay the burial if it would result in more respect for the dead, for example if a substantially greater number of people would come to the burial. However, we can’t use this law to provide a proof that kabod habreut could push aside a Biblical commandment because the nature of the Commandment is to give the maximum amount of honor to the corpse so it would only make sense that delaying the burial would be permissible if it would show greater respect for the corpse.
I would like to return to the latter segment in tractate Berachot . The Talmud continues the questioning of Rab’s statement (that kabod habreut is not permissible when it is weighed against honor of Hashem and his Torah). The next refutation is based on the laws regarding returning lost objects. The Torah states ‘And you shall hide from them ‘ This teaches us that there are some times when you may hide from returning a lost object and there are times when you may not hide from returning a lost object. How so? If the finder is an elderly man and it is beneath his dignity to pick up this object and return it, he is not obligated to do so. Now why is it so; why should the elder be permitted to not return the lost object based on his dignity? Let us say, ‘œThere is no value to wisdom or understanding or counsel when weighed against the honor of Hashem’? The Talmud resolves this question by stating that this case is different because it is written that there are times when it is permissible and this isn’t a case to generalize from because this deals with money matters but when dealing with other areas the law would not be so. At this point, Rav’s ruling stays intact because his case of wool and linen does not deal with a monetary issue. So although one may push aside a Biblical law, it does not mean that all Biblical laws may be transgressed when they conflict with kabod habreut.
The Talmud makes one final attempt to dispute Rav’s ruling. ‘œCome hear the following baraita: when the verse states concerning a nazir that he shall not contaminate himself with tumah ‘œor for his sister ‘ what does it come to teach? It teaches the following. If a man was going to slaughter his paschal sacrifice or to circumcise his son and he heard that someone related to him, such as his sister, had died, he should not contaminate himself so as not to prevent him from performing his religious obligations. However, if he comes across an unattended corpse although you might think that so too he should not contaminate himself the verse teaches us that it is only for his sister or other relatives that he should not contaminate himself but for an unattended corpse he may contaminate himself. Why is this so? Why do we say that the dignity of the corpse supersedes the obligation to perform the commandments of the Pesach sacrifice or that of circumcising one’s son? Why don’t we say, ‘œThere is no value to wisdom or understanding or counsel when weighed against the honor of Hashem’? The Talmud again resolves this critique by stating that there is a specific verse that allows setting aside an obligation when it conflicts with kabod habreut. Furthermore, we can’t generalize from this ruling to other rulings because to sit and refrain from doing a mitzvah (in this case, refraining from performing the sacrifice and circumcision) is different than actively transgressing a Biblical prohibition. Rashi also states that the main reason for allowing an elderly man to turn aside and not return a lost object is because it is also a matter of sitting and refraining from picking it up. The Rambam explains that the reason why the case of the lost object is pushed aside is because it is a monetary issue. This is why Rav’s ruling stands up that one must remove a garment containing wool and linen even if he will suffer from humiliation. Wearing wool and linen in one garment is a Biblical transgression and by wearing it you are doing something active and it is not a monetary issue.
An obvious question that we must now address, isn’t the nazir or kohen by becoming impure actively transgressing the violation that prohibits them from becoming impure? The Rishonim deal with this issue. Rashi explains that as we mentioned before by the lost object that it was permitted based on a verse so too by the nazir and kohen there is a specific verse that allows (this is different than being doche, pushing aside a violation. Hutra/permissible means that nothing has been violated. Doche/pushing aside means that we allow the violation because we give preference to one mitzvah over the other) the nazir or kohen to become impure for an unattended corpse. Since here alone we have a specified verse, its ruling can’t be generalized to other areas in Halacha. Tosfot learns the segment slightly differently. It is not that there is a specific verse that permits the contamination as if it was never included in the prohibition but rather it pushes aside (doche) the violation based on kabod habreut, but the laws regarding a nazir and kohen are unique to them and can’t have their unique laws apply to other areas.
Before I continue, I would like to summarize what we have learned thus far.
There are many commandments that are related to preserving a man’s dignity and showing proper respect. In addition to the Biblical commandments, there are rabbinic decrees that also stress the importance of kabod habreut. We have also learned that when there is a conflict between the honor of man and the honor of Hashem, we give preference to Hashem. We have seen a few exceptions to this rule, but they have their specific reasons why they are allowed to violate the commandments and can’t be generalized, either because they are monetary issues, done so passively or have a special verse to allow it. However, it is not permissible to actively violate other Biblical prohibitions. Kabod Habreut is permissible when opposing rabbinic decrees even actively. The rabbis suspended their rulings when faced against man’s dignity.
What about accidentally actively violating a Biblical prohibition? For instance, if it is not you that is wearing the garment that contains wool and linen (constituting an active violation of a Biblical prohibition) but rather your friend, and he is doing so unknowingly, are you obligated to remove his garment and humiliate him or do we say that if the Biblical prohibition is being done so accidentally we push it aside for the sake of his dignity?
This is a dispute between the Rambam and the Rosh. The Rambam states that if you see biblical kelaim (wool and linen) on your friend even if he is your teacher, you must remove it from him immediately. Kabod habreut does not push aside a prohibition that is mentioned in the Bible. The Rambam made an absolute statement implying even if the transgression is being done so accidentally.
The Rosh takes the opposite side. If your friend is unknowingly wearing a garment containing wool and linen, you should not remove it from him if it will humiliate him. The Rosh maintains his view because the page in tractate Berachot is only talking about a case where you are wearing the forbidden garment. Once you are aware of the violation you must remove the garment. If your friend is unaware that he is violating it you should not embarrass him.
In addition to the Rambam and Rosh arguing how to understand the passage in Berachot, they argue on whether or not an accidental violation is considered an active violation. The Rosh understands that as long as you know about the violation but your friend does not, it is only considered as if you are sitting and refraining, as we have learned earlier that kavod habreut pushes aside a prohibition if done so passively. The Rambam does not consider this to be a passive violation because the transgressor is actively violating the prohibition.
The Noda Beyehuda received the following question. A young man was having an affair with a married woman. According to the Biblical law a woman that cheats on her husband is forbidden to have marital relations with him. This young man repented and eventually married the daughter of the woman that he had slept with. The family is well known and well respected and news about the affair would humiliate everyone involved. Is the son-in-law obligated to tell his father-in-law that he is not allowed to sleep with his wife because she had cheated on him?
The Noda Beyehuda says that this is the dispute between the Rambam and the Rosh. The father-in-law is actively violating a Biblical prohibition by sleeping with his wife; however, it is being done so unknowingly. The Rambam would say that it doesn’t matter that it is accidental, the son-in-law must tell the father-in-law. The Rosh would say that since it is only being done accidentally, based on kavod habreut the son-in-law does not have to inform his father-in-law that he is violating a Biblical prohibition.
In conclusion, there are many commandments that stress proper respect and maintaining the dignity of man. Since man was formed in the image of G-d, G-d takes any degradation of man as an affront to himself. The rabbis have also instituted many different decrees to prevent somebody from being embarrassed. When there is a conflict between kabod habreut and another mitzvah there are times when man’s dignity takes precedence. Kabod habreut is permitted either actively or passively when opposed by rabbinic decrees. The Rabbis never instituted their decrees when it opposes kabod habreut. With Biblical commandments kavod habreut does have its restrictions. Kabod habreut will push aside the commandment if it is being violated passively or if it deals with a monetary issue. If a Biblical prohibition is to be actively violated then we ignore the honor of man. Whenever there is a conflict between man’s honor and G-d’s honor, G-d’s honor is taken into consideration over man’s honor. There are some exceptions to this rule, but they have a verse that allows the violation and can’t be generalized. There is a dispute between the Rambam and the Rosh if one can accidentally actively violate a Biblical prohibition.

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Bibliography
Genesis, 39:25
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Proverbs, 21:30
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